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1. Introduction 
In traditional study of supply chain management, people mainly consider the decisions 
from perspective of the operations management, such as, capacity, inventory, ordering level, 
pricing, etc., and often ignore to consider the impact of financial flow within the supply 
chain. However, the key function of supply chain management is concerned with the 
coordination of material flows, information flows, and funds flow (Figure 1). Therefore, the 
operation decisions of a firm is affected by its own initial capital status. For instance, with 
the globalization and international competition intensified, many companies have 
experienced a shortage of capital. The constrained capital of a company could affect the 
funds flow in the supply chain, and the performance of the entire supply chain as well. 
In global supply chain, and especially in the post-financial-crisis era, capital constraints are 
strengthened by common cash-management practices that promote collecting account 
receivable as quickly as possible while postponing payments to providers and suppliers. 
This “war for cash” (Milne, 2009) is squeezing small companies harder—these cash-strapped 
companies find themselves faced with increasing chances of going out of business. Also, the 
fact that large buyers are forcing suppliers from less developed countries to move to open 
account has further contributed to the problem of cash flow (UPS Capital, 2007). 
Consequently, a company with capital constraints who cannot raise funds from bank credit 
channel or other’s channel could hurt its own profit as well as that of the entire supply 
chain. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Three types of flows in the supply chain 
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How to solve this grave problem of capital constraints in the supply chain in developing or 
developed economics? To answer this question, this chapter sheds some light on how 
Supply Chain Finance (SCF) impacts agents’ operational and financial decisions under the 
symmetric/asymmetric information and how SCF can create value for supply chain with 
capital constraints.  In this chapter, we define SCF as the jointly operations/logistics and 
financing service, offered by a 3PL firm (Control Role), or an alliance of 3PL firm 
(Delegation Role) and financial institution (i.e., bank), etc. On one hand, SCF is a financing 
service which can relax the capital constraints in the supply chain; on the other hand, SCF is 
combined with a logistics service or trade transaction service.  
Different from traditional commercial loans which rely on fixed assets as the securities, SCF 
commonly depends on the liquid asset, such as inventories, accounting receivables or 
others, as the collateral. Since the bank does not have the resources to track or monitor the 
status of liquid assets, the bank could refuse to offer financing service with liquid assets as 
the collateral. Instead, the bank prefers to offer the fixed asset based financing. 
Unfortunately, the small-medium size firms are often of limited fixed asset, and could not 
raise funds from the bank by fixed-asset-based-financing. Even the development of 
Globalization and Outsourcing has resulted in fewer assets for the firms in the supply chain, 
making it more difficult for firms to borrow funds secured by fixed-based-financing. Then, 
SCF, as an innovative financing solution, bridges the bank and capital-constrained firms in 
the supply chain, reduces the mismatch risk of supply and demand in the financial flow, 
and creates value for supply chain with capital constraints.   
Based on the definition of SCF, the 3PL firm plays an important role in SCF, since it is able to 
have access to various information generating from supply chain’s activities, and then 
marry this information with the material flow. Consequently, the coupling of information 
and material flows enable lenders (i.e., banks) to mitigate financial risk within the supply 
chain, and then reduce the credit risks of financing service. The mitigation of financing risk 
allows the capital-constrained firm in the supply chain more capital to be raised, capital to 
be accessed sooner or capital to be raised at lower rates1.  
Before characterizing the value of SCF in the supply chain with capital constraints, we 
further illustrate the meanings of SCF by the following three examples in real business 
operations (Caldentey and Chen 2010, Chen and Wan 2011, Chen and Cai 2011).  
Chinese Material Shortage Transportation Group (CMST) is one of the largest logistics 
enterprises in China. Many small and medium size paper manufacturers in mainland China 
purchase materials from international suppliers. It is not uncommon that the financial 
system is unable to provide adequate services to support these manufacturers though they 
are short of capital. As a result, most of these small manufacturers find themselves making 
suboptimal procurement decisions. CMST viewed this gap as a business opportunity and, 
since 2002, started financing these small paper manufacturers to buy paper materials from 
international suppliers while simultaneously providing the logistics services required in 
these transactions. Under this credit contract, the paper manufacturer pays a fraction of the 
wholesale price charged by the supplier as a deposit and CMST covers the difference. After 
the sale season, the manufacturer repays CMST the remaining fraction of the wholesale 
price. With this supply chain financing service, CMST has become one of the leading 
                                                                 
1 We refer the reader to read UPS Captal Global Supply Chain Finance in 2007. 
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logistics-financing service providers in China. In 2006, CMST financing supply chain 
business was about 1.1 billion dollars, up from 750 million dollars in 2005. Currently, this 
operation is one of most popular modes of financing for small-and-medium companies in 
China. As the CMST example unveils, bringing financing services into supply chain 
management has the potential to improve the operational efficiency and the profits of the 
entire supply chain.  
In an example of a mobile-phone supply chain in China, a manufacturer sells mobile-phones 
to end-users via retailers. Although demand for the mobile phones is high, many retailers 
can order only a limited number of mobile phones from the manufacturer because of limited 
cash. Hence, the capital constraints of retailers strongly influence both the retailers’ and 
manufacturer’s revenue, as well as the performance of the entire supply chain. With the 
above situation taken into consideration, the manufacturer built an alliance with a local 
bank to motivate the bank to offer commercial loans to those capital-constrained retailers. 
This practice achieved great success and the manufacturer attained its largest market share 
in 2002. Since then, many mobile-phone manufacturers in China have started to cooperate 
with banks to help capital-constrained retailers make loans from banks to increase their 
revenue. As discussed above, capital constraints may influence the operational decisions in 
a supply chain while financing may relax the constraints with additional costs (usually in 
form of interest). Therefore, it is important to know how financing influences the 
operational decisions and performance of individual firms in a capital-constrained supply 
chain, and how a retailer jointly makes operational and financial decisions under capital 
constraints. 
Financing support from banks could facilitate capital-constrained companies greatly. A 
professional aluminum ingots trading company grew from less than 5 million Yuan to over 
600 million Yuan in one year, with the aid of a goods-ownership mortgage loan (50 million 
Yuan) from Shenzhen Development Bank. However, not all companies could get as lucky as 
the one in this case. Banks might not be willing to provide financing service for it’s difficult 
for them to monitor the transactions of the products. Thus, without accurate real-time 
information about the transactions, banks would have to figure out some way to keep the 
capital-constrained companies from diverting the loan to other riskier projects. Here comes 
the integrating logistics and financing service (ILFS), through third party logistics (3PL) firms 
that ally with financial institutions and provide cooperative logistics and financial solutions 
to capital-constrained retailers. The benefits of ILFS are absolutely worth discussing. 
These examples show that SCF plays an important role in the real business. However, the 
research on SCF is very limited in the literature. The motivation of this chapter is to make a 
first step on the research about this field.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We review the literature in Section 2. Under 
the symmetric information, we inspect the value of financing service to the supply chain 
with capital constraints, and examine the jointly operations and financing decisions for the 
agents, in Section 3. We then model to highlight the value of 3PL firm in SCF under 
asymmetric information, and analyze how SCF could create more value for supply chain in 
Section 4 and 5. We conclude in Section 6. 
2. Literature review 
Our work is relative to the interface research of operations and financial management. In 
this section, we firstly review the related work in the economic and financial area;   
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secondly, we further review the current research of operations/finance track; finally, we 
analyse the related work in which 3PL firm plays a role in supply chain’s financing service. 
Economics research has shown that a buyer’s budget constraints may influence the optimal 
mechanism of supply/procurement contract. In this vein, Levaggi (1999) develops a 
principal-agent model in which the principal (a buyer) faces a binding budget constraint, 
and argues the budget constraint does not guarantee that the principal is always better off if 
an incentive compatible contract is used. Hence the likely outcome is either a pooling or a 
bargaining solution. Che and Gale (2000) argues that a buyer’s budget constraint may make 
it optimal for the seller to use non-linear pricing, to commit to a declining price sequence, to 
require the buyer to disclose her budget, or to offer financing. Simchi-Levi and Thomas 
(2002) study the non-linear pricing problem when a budget constraint limits the magnitude 
of monetary transfer. The literature examines only the operational decisions, and does not 
consider the interaction between operational decisions and financial decisions. In this 
chapter, we study the supply chain management problem in which the retailer is capital-
constrained, thus involving both financial decisions and operational decisions 
simultaneously. 
In finance literature, researchers mostly study a firm’s integrated investment decision which 
influences its capacity sizes and debt decisions, and implicitly study a firm’s integrated 
operational and financial decisions. For example, Dotan and Ravid (1985) show that the 
investment and optimal financial decisions have to be made simultaneously and that a 
negative relationship exists between capacity expansion and the financial leverage. 
Dammon and Senbet (1998) analyse how the corporate and personal taxes influence a firm’s 
optimal investment and financial decisions under uncertainty. They show that, when 
investment (equity investment) is allowed to adjust optimally, the existing prediction about 
the relationship between investment-related and debt-related tax shields must be modified. 
Mello and Parsons (1992) compare the operational decisions of a mine under all-equity 
financing policy with those mines of partial financing to maximise leveraged equity value. 
Mauer and Triantis (1994) analyse the case where the firm has the flexibility to shut down or 
reopen its production facility in response to price fluctuations. In contrast to the literature in 
economics and finance, this chapter incorporates the financial decisions into operational 
decisions more directly and analyses the interactions between financial and operational 
decisions. 
In the literature on supply chain management, researchers are mostly concerned with the 
material flow and often ignore the impact of the financial flow. For instance, in Graves and 
Ton (2003) and Simchi-Levi et al. (2004), the mostly studied problems include production 
planning/inventory control, capacity expansion and performance of supply chains. 
However, financial flows are important in real-world supply chain management. Caldentey 
and Haugh (2005) argue that budget constraints are quite common in practice due to many 
reasons. 
Recently, more and more studies in operations management have started to look at the 
interface between operations and financial management. Chen and Wan (2011) reveal how 
supply chain could benefit from financing services, compared to the situation without 
financing services. However, most literature is concerned with the integrated operational 
and financial decisions based on retailer’s behaviour/strategy in a supply chain under 
symmetric information. For instance, most literature focuses on discussion of the budget-
constrained firm’s production/inventory or capacity decisions and debt decisions, and seeks 
to demonstrate that it is important to incorporate financial decisions into operational 
www.intechopen.com
 
The Value of Supply Chain Finance 115 
decisions. Buzacott and Zhang show the importance of joint production and financial 
decisions in a start-up setting, where the firm’s growth capability is mainly constrained by 
its limited capital and depends on bank loans. They use a single period newsvendor model 
to explain the motivation for asset-based financing by analysing the decision-making at a 
bank and a set of retailers with different budgets. Hu and Sobel (2005) use a dynamic 
newsvendor model with a criterion of maximising the expected present value of dividends 
to analyse the interdependence of a firm’s capital structure and its short-term operational 
decisions involving inventory, dividends and liquidity. Chao et al. (2008) use multi-period 
inventory models to provide insights into the interaction between financial and operational 
decisions, and shows that it is essential for the retailers to take financial considerations into 
their operational decisions, especially for the retailers who are short of capitals. Boyabatli 
and Toktay (2006) analyse the impact of capital market imperfection on a firm’s operational 
and financial decisions in a capacity investment setting, where the firm’s limited budget, 
depending partly on a tradable asset, can be increased by borrowing from external market 
(commercial loan collateralised by physical asset), and its distribution can be altered with 
financial risk management (using forward contract to reduce the financial risk of tradable 
asset). However, all literature except for Buzacott and Zhang (2004) assume the interest rate 
of a loan is exogenous, ignoring the impact of competition of financial market or borrowing 
level on the interest rate of loan. Buzacott and Zhang (2004) consider the bank’s decision on 
the interest rate but their optimal interest rate is independent of the competition in a 
financial market. 
Although currently an increasing number of literature considers the jointly operations and 
financial decisions in the supply chain management area, limited literature characterises the 
value of SCF or the role of 3PL firm in the supply chain with capital constraints. Hofman 
(2005) introduces some conceptual insights of supply chain finance, and help the executives 
to look behind the SCF approach. To the best of our knowledge, among the first to examine 
the value of 3PL firm’s integrated logistics and financing service is the paper by Chen and 
Xie (2009).  They use the model to show that if 3PL firm offers the conventional logistics 
service, the budget-constrained retailer may not apply for loans successfully because of the 
asymmetric information, and also show that a monopolistic or competitive financing market 
can create value for budget-constrained supply chain. Lu et al. (2009) inspect the incentive of 
logistics service provider (LSP) for a 3PL firm to provide financial support to the 
retailer/supplier and to establish the backup inventory. Chen and Cai (2010) investigates an 
extended supply chain model with a supplier, a budget-constrained retailer, a bank, and a 
3PL firm, in which the retailer has insufficient initial budget and may borrow or obtain trade 
credit from either a bank (traditional role) or a 3PL firm (control role). Their analysis 
indicates that the control role model yields higher profits not only for the 3PL firm but also 
for the supplier, the retailer, and the entire supply chain.  
In order to inspect the value of supply chain finance, in this current chapter we would 
mostly summarize some of the results and highlights from Chen and Wan (2011), Chen and 
Xie (2009), and Chen and Cai (2011). This chapter emphasizes on understanding of SCF and 
3PL firm’s value in the capital-constrained supply chain.   
3. Model description and assumptions 
We consider a simple supply chain with a supplier and a retailer. The supplier produces a 
single product which retailer sells to customers. Demand D is a nonnegative random 
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variable with a cumulative distribution function ܨሺܦሻ. We define the Hazard Function hሺDሻ  ൌ  fሺDሻ/FതሺDሻ and the Generalized Failure Rate (GFR) HሺDሻ  ൌ  DhሺDሻ, where FതሺDሻ ൌ ͳ െ F ሺDሻ is the tail distribution of F(D). We also impose the following assumption to 
guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of our model. 
Assumption A1: The demand distribution function FሺDሻ has the following properties:  
i.  It is absolutely continuous with density ݂ሺܦሻ  ൐  Ͳ in ሺܽ, ܾሻ, for Ͳ ൑  a ൑  b ൑  ∞.  
ii.  It has a finite mean  Dഥ. 
iii.  The generalized failure rate HሺDሻ is increasing in D ൒  Ͳ (IGFR). 
We discuss the situation with symmetric information (i.e., all information is common 
knowledge to both the supplier and the retailer) first (and asymmetric information will be 
mentioned later). In particular, we assume the supplier and the bank know the retailer’s 
initial capital B, the demand probability distribution FሺDሻ, and the retail price p. We use 
superscripts, B, R and S to denote the bank, the retailer, and the supplier, respectively, and 
use subscripts F or NF to denote the case the retailer does or does not have the chance to 
raise funds from a competitive financial market, respectively. 
A feature of our model is the introduction of an initial capital constraint on the retailer, 
which may limit her order levels. We assume the retailer has an initial capital B for ordering 
products from the supplier while the supplier has no capital constraints (i.e., he has 
sufficient working capital to pay for the manufacturing costs). Furthermore, we assume that 
all parties (the supplier, the retailer, and banks) are risk-neutral. Based on the financial 
“pecking order” theory, we also assume the retailer uses up all her capital before 
considering making a loan from a bank. Let the risk-free interest rate of the financial market 
be r௙ . The banks are always willing to finance the retailer for purchasing products with an 
interest rate ݎி  ሺBሻ, and act competitively such that the expected return on a loan is equal to 
the expected return with the risk-free interest r௙ . Here, r௙ can be regarded as the average 
return on investment in the competitive financial market. Therefore, r௙ can be used to 
measure competition of services in the financial market. The lower the risk-free interest rate r௙, the stronger the competition in the financial market. For example, the financial market 
has the strongest competition when r௙ = 0. Intuitively, many banks competing sufficiently in 
the financial market could lead to the result that the average return on investment for the 
financial market be reduced to (normalized) zero. 
Due to the popularity of the wholesale price contract in both academics and practice, we 
consider a capital-constrained supply chain with financing service under such a contract. In 
our model, we assume the following sequence: At the beginning of the period ሺt ൌ  Ͳሻ, the 
supplier offers a wholesale price contract ሺwሻ, an exogenous variable, to the retailer, then the 
retailer decides to accept or reject the contract; If the retailer accepts the contract and chooses 
ordering quantity Qி  ሺwሻ, she may also make a commercial loan from the bank; 
Learning Qி  ሺwሻ, the bank announces the interest rate ݎி  ሺBሻ for the loan that amounts 
to ሺwQி  ሺwሻ  െ  Bሻା, where ሺxሻା  ൌ  maxሼx, Ͳሽ; The retailer borrows loan  ሺwQி  ሺwሻ  െ  Bሻା 
from the bank and pays the amount wQி  ሺwሻ to the supplier for her order; The supplier 
produces and deliveries to the retailer before the selling season. At the end of the 
period ሺt ൌ  T ሻ, demand is realized. The revenue is equal to p minሼD, Q ிሺwሻሽ, where p is a 
fixed retailer price, and finally a payment ሺ ሺwQி  ሺwሻ  െ  Bሻାሺͳ ൅ ݎி  ሺBሻሻሻ is made by the 
retailer to the bank. Certainly, if the retailer rejects the contract, the game ends and each firm 
earns a default payoff. Neither a salvage value nor a return policy for unsold units is 
assumed in our model. 
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Before we inspect the 3PL firm’s role, we model the game between the bank and the retailer 
in this current section. 
3.1 The bank 
Assume banks in the financial market have enough cash for loans. At time t ൌ  Ͳ (i.e., 
beginning of selling season), the retailer makes an order quantity Qி  ሺwሻ in response to the 
wholesale price contract w chosen by the supplier, and a bank may announce a loan contract 
(ݎி  ሺBሻ) to the retailer, whose initial capital is B, for loan size  ሺwQி  ሺwሻ  െ  Bሻା. With the 
support of a loan from the bank, the retailer is able to make the full payment to the supplier. 
At time t ൌ  T (i.e., the end of the selling season), the loan generates a random payoff ࣦ ൌ  p minሼD, Q Fሺwሻሽ for the retailer, and revenue for the bank is equal to min൛ࣦ, LሺBሻ൫ͳ ൅ ݎி  ሺBሻ൯ൟ, where LሺBሻ  ൌ   ሺwQி  ሺwሻ  െ  Bሻା. If revenue ࣦ falls below the sum of the principle 
and the interest of a loan (i. e., LሺBሻ൫ͳ ൅  ݎி  ሺBሻ൯), then the retailer may declare a 
bankruptcy, and the bank suffers a loss from the loan. Otherwise, the bank makes an 
expected profit LሺBሻݎி  ሺBሻ as a return on the loan. 
From previous assumption, the bank is risk-neutral and operates in a competitive financial 
market, it will set an interest rate ݎி  ሺBሻ that yields the expected profit. The profit is equal to 
the one generated by a risk-free interest rate r୤ in the competitive financial market. 
Intuitively, under the risk-neutral assumption, banks are indifferent to risks, and the payoff 
of risk- free capital and the return of financing service are identical. Hence, the interest rate 
on a loan is determined by the following equation: ܮሺܤሻ൫ͳ ൅ ݎ௙ ൯ ൌ ܧ ൣ݉݅݊൛ࣦ , ܮሺܤሻ൫ͳ ൅ ݎி ሺܤሻ൯ൟ൧ (1)
Here, the bank evaluates the credit risk of loans based on the retailer’s initial capital. The 
assumption of competitive financing is also found in the previous literature in economics, 
finance, and operations field, such as, Brenna et al. (1988), Dotan and Ravid (1985), Xu and 
Birge (2004), etc.. 
3.2 The retailer 
The impact of the retailer’s limited initial capital on the execution of the wholesale price 
contract is twofold. First, the order quantity placed at  t ൌ  Ͳ could satisfy the capital 
constraint B ൑  wQ Fሺwሻ. Second, if demand D is too low, then the retailer is unable to pay 
the bank the full amount  ሺwQி  ሺwሻ െ  Bሻା൫ͳ ൅  ݎி  ሺBሻ൯ that is due at time T. In this case 
(occurring if p minሼD, Q Fሺwሻሽ ൏  ሺwQி  ሺwሻ  െ  Bሻା൫ͳ ൅ ݎி  ሺBሻ൯), the retailer declares 
bankruptcy and the bank collects only p minሼD, Q Fሺwሻሽ instead of ሺwQி  ሺwሻ  െ  Bሻା൫ͳ ൅ ݎி  ሺBሻ൯. In this case we say the retailer has limited liability.  
For a given wholesale price contract (w), the capital-constrained retailer with an initial 
capital B chooses order quantity Q Fሺwሻ, and may raise funds  ሺwQி  ሺwሻ  െ  Bሻା from the 
bank under the interest rate ݎி  ሺBሻ. Then, the retailer’s net expected payoff is a function of Q Fሺwሻ and defined as:      πFୖ ሺQி  ሺwሻሻ  ൌ  E ൤ቀp minሼD, Q Fሺwሻሽ  െ  ሺwQி  ሺwሻ  െ  Bሻା൫ͳ ൅  ݎி  ሺBሻ൯ቁା  െ  B൨ , 
where Eሾ൉ሿ denotes the expectation with respect to FሺDሻ. Note that in the definition of πFୖ ሺQி  ሺwሻሻ the initial capital B is subtracted from the retailer’s profits. Hence, πFୖ ሺQி  ሺwሻሻ 
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measures the net profit the retailer obtains by operating in this supply chain. For example, if 
the retailer chooses Qி  ሺwሻ ൌ Ͳ then her net payoff is zero, reflecting the fact that she gains 
nothing from her business. The retailer’s optimal net expected payoff is obtained by solving 
the following program: 
                      ߎிோכሺܤሻ ൌ ݉ܽݔொ ಷሺ௪ሻஹ଴ ߨிோ൫ܳி ሺݓሻ൯ൌ ݉ܽݔொ ಷሺ௪ሻஹ଴ ܧ ቂ൫݌ ݉݅݊ሼܦ, ܳ ிሺݓሻሽ ൅ ܤ െ ݓܳி ሺݓሻ െ ܮሺܤሻݎி ሺܤሻ൯ା  െ ܤ൧ (2)
 
subject to: ܮሺܤሻ ൌ ሺݓܳி ሺݓሻ െ ܤሻା (3)
It is worth noting that the positive part in the definition of Πிୖ כሺBሻ captures the retailer’s 
limited liability in the case of bankruptcy. Here we implicitly assume the retailer has no 
other investment opportunity except her retailing business. This is to clearly show the 
financing service (represented here by banking loans) is a value generating activity. 
Notice that when the retailer cannot have the access to the financial market, the optimization 
problem for her is then given by: ߎேிோכ ሺܤሻ ൌ ݉ܽݔொ ಿಷሺ௪ሻஹ଴ ܧ ሾ݌ ݉݅݊ሼܦ, ܳ ிሺݓሻሽ െ ݓܳேி ሺݓሻሿ (4)
subject to: Ͳ ൑ ݓܳேி ሺݓሻ ൑ ܤ (5)
If the retailer does not have capital constraints, the capital constraint (5) is redundant and 
has no impact on the retailer’s order decisions. Hence, (4) becomes a standard newsvendor 
problem and the optimal order level is given by Qேሺwሻ  ൌ Fത ିଵ ቀ୵௣ቁ. However, if the initial 
capital is not sufficient to support optimal ordering (i.e., 
୆ ௪ ൏  Q୒ሺwሻ), the capital constraint 
(5) is active and the retailer cannot achieve her optimal order level. (4)-(5) indicate the 
retailer’s capital constraints may influence her order level. Depending on the tightness of the 
constraints, the effects can be significant. Therefore, when the retailer has no access to the 
financial market, the optimal order policy for the retailer with capital constraints is Qேிכ ሺwሻ  ൌ  minሼ ୆ ௪  , Q୒ ሺwሻሽ. 
In the following section, we should analyse how the financing service has the impacts on the 
performance of supply chain with capital constraints under symmetric information. 
 
4. Financing service and supply chain’s performance 
Based on the assumptions in Section 3, under the case where the retailer has access to a 
financial market, and then chooses order quantity QFሺwFሻ for an exogenous wholesale price wF from the supplier. Noting that when the retailer orders QFሺwFሻ, the bank immediately 
announces an interest rate ݎி  ሺBሻ. 
We proceed backwards to derive the equilibrium in the competitive finance market and the 
supply chain. Firstly, we determine the interest rate rFכ  ሺBሻ by solving Eq. (1); Secondly, we 
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compute the retailer’s best response as a function of a strategy chosen by the supplier by 
solving the retailer’s optimization problem in (2)-(3) to find QFכ ൫wF, rFכ  ሺBሻ൯ for a fixed 
wholesale price (wF) and a given rFכ  ሺBሻሺBሻ. 
4.1 Supply chain performance without financing service 
In the following discussion we assume the retailer has no access to financial markets as a 
benchmark for comparison, to address the motivation of financing services from a 
competitive financial market. 
Recall that the optimal order problem without the financing service for a retailer who has 
capital constraints in (4)-(5) is: Qேிכ ሺݓேிሻ ൌ ݉݅݊ ൜ ܤݓேி , Fത ିଵ ൬ݓேி݌ ൰ൠ 
In the setting in which retailers cannot have access to the financial market, the optimal 
ordering level for the retailers ܳேி is Qேிכ ሺݓሻ ൌ ݉݅݊ ቄ஻௪ , Fത ିଵ ቀ௪௣ቁቅ . When B ൑ wFത ିଵ ቀ௪௣ቁ, Qேிכ ሺݓሻ ൌ ஻௪ ; When B ൐ ݓFത ିଵ ቀ௪௣ቁ, Qேிכ ሺݓሻ is the constant value of Fത ିଵ ቀ௪௣ቁ. Obviously, 
without the support of financing service from financing market, the capital-constrained 
retailer is not able to make an optimal ordering level in the traditional newsvendor model, Qேሺwሻ  ൌ Fത ିଵ ቀ୵௣ቁ, and leads to the loss to the supply chain performance. 
4.2 Supply chain performance with financing service 
Different to the previous subsection, we consider that the capital-constrained retailer has 
access to a competitive financing market during the operations of supply chain. We should 
show how the financing service affects the supply chain performance. 
The decisions of bank 
Recall the assumption of financing market in Section 3, by (1), the bank may determine the 
optimal interest rate rFכ  ሺBሻ as follows:  ሺݓிܳி  ሺݓிሻ െ ܤሻା൫ͳ ൅ ݎ௙൯ ൌ ܧൣ݉݅݊൛ࣦ, ሺݓிܳி ሺݓிሻ െ ܤሻା൫ͳ ൅ ݎிכሺܤሻ൯ൟ൧ (6)
We can show the existence and uniqueness of ݎிכሺBሻ by the following reason, for any r ୤ ൒  Ͳ, 
any scalar y ൒  Ͳ, and any random variable ࣦ ൒ 0, there exists a unique r ൒  r ୤ such that yሺͳ ൅ r ୤ሻ  ൌ  Eሾminሼࣦ, yሺͳ ൅ rሻሽሿ if and only if Eሾࣦሿ  ൒  yሺͳ ൅ r ୤ሻ. (Refer to Chen and Wan 
2011).  
Consequently, , let y be the loan size LሺBሻ  ൌ   ሺwிQி  ሺwிሻ  െ  Bሻା, r ൌ ݎிכሺBሻ, and let L be the 
retailer’s random revenue pminሼD, Qி  ሺwிሻ ሽ, then if the condition Eሾࣦሿ  ൒   ሺwிQி  ሺwிሻ  െ Bሻା൫ͳ ൅  ݎ௙൯ holds, we can obtain a unique interest rate ݎிכሺBሻ ൐ ݎ௙ by solving the equation  ሺwிQி  ሺwிሻ  െ  Bሻା൫ͳ ൅ ݎ௙൯ ൌ Eൣmin൛ࣦ,  ሺwிQி  ሺwிሻ  െ  Bሻା൫ͳ ൅ ݎிכሺBሻ൯ൟ൧. Furthermore, we 
can derive the optimal interest rate for a bank as follows.  
For a given order level Qி  ሺwிሻ ൒  Ͳ and c ൑ wF ൑  p, the retailer with an initial capital B 
may make a loan  ሺwிQி  ሺwிሻ  െ  Bሻା from a bank in the competitive financial market, with a risk-free interest rate r୤ ൒  Ͳ. If the capital-constrained retailer has limited liability, then: i. there exists a unique interest rate rFכሺBሻ charged by the bank satisfying the following equation:  ሺwFQF ሺwFሻ  െ  Bሻାሺͳ ൅ r୤ሻ ൌ Eൣmin൛ࣦ,  ሺwFQF ሺwFሻ  െ  Bሻା൫ͳ ൅ rFכሺBሻ൯ൟ൧; 
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Supply Chain Management - Applications and Simulations 120 ii. rFכሺBሻ is monotonically increasing when retailer’s initial capital B decreases;  iii. for a fixed initial capital B, rFכሺBሻ increases with the risk-free interest rate ݎ௙ . The above characteristics of  rFכሺBሻ can be illustrated by Figure ʹ.  
 
Fig. 2. The relationship between interest rate ݎிכሺBሻ and B, ݎ௙ 
The decisions of retailer 
If the wholesale price contract is wF, then the retailer may make a loan of LሺBሻ ൌ ሺwFQF ሺwFሻ  െ  Bሻା with an interest rate rFכሺBሻ from a bank in the financial market. By the 
decisions of the bank, we can show that the sufficient and necessary condition for the 
existence of a loan is pEሾminሼD, QF ሺwFሻሽሿ  ൒  ሺwFQF ሺwFሻ  െ  Bሻାሺͳ ൅ r୤ሻ. Therefore, the 
retailer’s optimization problem with financing service (2)-(3) can be formulated as: ߎிோכሺܤሻ ൌ ݉ܽݔொ ಷሺ௪ಷሻஹ଴ ܧ ቂ൫݌ ݉݅݊ሼܦ, ܳ ிሺݓிሻሽ ൅ ܤ െ ݓிܳி  ሺݓிሻ െ ܮሺܤሻݎிכሺܤሻ൯ା െ ܤቃ 
subject to : ܮሺܤሻ ൌ ሺݓிܳி ሺݓிሻ– ܤሻା ݌ܧሾ݉݅݊ሼܦ, ܳ ிሺݓிሻሽሿ ൒  ሺݓிܳி  ሺݓிሻ–  ܤሻା൫ͳ ൅  ݎ௙൯ ܮሺܤሻ൫ͳ ൅ ݎ௙൯ ൌ ܧ݉݅݊ൣ݌ ݉݅݊ሼܦ, ܳ ிሺݓிሻሽ, ܮሺܤሻ൫ͳ ൅ ݎிכሺܤሻ൯൧ (7)
We can rewrite the constraint in Eq. (7) as follows Eሾminሼp minሼD, Q FሺwFሻሽ െ LሺBሻሺͳ ൅  r୤ሻ, LሺBሻሺrFכሺBሻ െ r୤ሻሽሿ ൌ Ͳ 
Then, by virtue of the constraint in (7), the retailer’s optimization reduces to the following 
equation. ΠFୖ ሺBሻ ൌ max୕ Fሺ୵Fሻஹ଴ Eሾp minሼD, Q FሺwFሻሽ െ LሺBሻሺͳ ൅ r୤ሻሿ െ B 
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subject to: 
 Eሾminሼp minሼD, Q FሺwFሻሽ െ LሺBሻሺͳ ൅  r୤ሻ, LሺBሻሺrFכሺBሻ െ r୤ሻሽሿ ൌ Ͳ 
 
Solving problem (7) we get: Qிכ ሺwிሻ ൌ ܨതିଵ ቀ௪ಷሺଵା௥ಷሻ௣ ר ͳቁ, where x ר y ൌ  minሾx, yሿ. To ensure 
the operability of the supply chain, the market price must exceed the purchasing cost, that 
is, wிሺͳ ൅  r୤ሻ  ൑  p. And we can rewrite Qிכ ሺBሻ ൌ ܨതିଵ ቀ௪ಷሺଵା௥೑ሻ௣ ቁ.  
Recall that, in the traditional newsvendor model with no capital constraint (Hadley and 
Whitin (1963)), for a given ݓி, the retailer’s optimal solution Qேሺݓிሻ solves the equation pFത൫Qேሺݓிሻ൯ ൌ ݓி  . This is the first-order optimality condition where the marginal revenue 
of an extra unit, pFത൫Qேሺݓிሻ൯, is equal to the cost of the extra unit, ݓி. Here, the first-order 
optimality condition is pFത൫ܳிכ ሺݓிሻ൯ ൌ ݓிሺͳ ൅  r୤ሻ. Since ݓிሺͳ ൅  r୤ሻ ൒ ݓி, it follows that a 
retailer with financing service and limited liability has higher marginal costs and Qிכ ሺwிሻ ൑ Qேሺݓிሻ.  
In the case where retailers can have access to a competitive financial market, the optimal 
ordering level for the retailers can be described by the following. When the retailer has a 
capital small to medium in size (i.e., B ൑ w ܨതିଵ ቀ௪ሺଵା௥ሻ௣ ቁ), the optimal order level for the 
retailer with limited liability is a constant ܨതିଵ ቀ௪ሺଵା௥೑ሻ௣ ቁ, and ܳிכ ሺݓሻ ൒ ܳேிכ ሺݓሻ; When the 
retailer has a medium capital (i.e., wܨതିଵ ቀ௪ሺଵା௥ሻ௣ ቁ ൏  ܤ ൑ ݓܨതିଵ ቀ௪௣ቁ ), the retailer does not 
make any loan but simply uses up her initial capital to order ܳிכ ሺݓሻ ൌ ஻௪, and ܳிכ ሺݓሻ ൌܳேிכ ሺݓሻ. In fact, the marginal revenue from a loan is not enough to offset the financial cost; 
hence, the retailer does not make any loan from banks; When the retailer has a large capital 
(i.e., B ൐ ݓܨതିଵ ቀ௪௣ቁ), the optimal order level is ܳிכ ሺݓሻ ൌ ܳேிכ ሺݓሻ ൌ ܳேሺݓሻ, and it is actually 
the optimal order level in a traditional newsvendor problem. Therefore, we can characterize 
the optimal operational and financial decisions of the retailer as functions of her initial 
capital as follows. 
These conclusions are shown in Table 1. We show that the risk-free interest rate ݎ௙ of the 
competitive financial market may influence the retailer’s optimal order level and loan size. 
In Figure 3, we plot the optimal order level as a function of the retailer’s initial capital. Note 
that the initial capital is B, demand follows a normal distribution N(500, 200), the risk-free 
interest rate is set to 0, 0.02, and 0.04, respectively, and p = 10, w = 8. As seen in Figure 2, all 
observations are consistent with what we discussed in this section. 
Fascinatingly, results in our model are related to the Modigliani-Miller Theory. If the capital 
markets are perfect, Modigliani and Miller (1958) prove that managers may consider 
financial decisions independently from the firm’s other decisions (e.g., capacity investment). 
In Section 4.2, a retailer with a small to medium capital and limited liability can raise funds 
from banks in a competitive financial market. Thus, we can instead hold that the retailer has 
access to an unlimited capital account with interest rate ݎ௙, which is similar to the perfect 
capital market in Modigliani-Miller Theory. Interestingly, the results show the retailer’s 
financial decisions on loan size can be separated from the order decisions. Therefore, we can 
conclude that a competitive financial market decouples the financial decisions and 
operational decisions. 
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Initial capital Loan QFכ ሺwሻ B ൑ w ܨതିଵ ቆݓሺͳ ൅ ݎ௙ሻ݌ ቇ Yes ܨതିଵ ቆݓሺͳ ൅ ݎ௙ሻ݌ ቇwܨതିଵ ቆݓሺͳ ൅ ݎ௙ሻ݌ ቇ ൏ ܤ ൑ ݓܨതିଵ ൬ݓ݌൰ None ܤݓ B ൐ ݓܨതିଵ ൬ݓ݌൰ None ܨതିଵ ൬ݓ݌൰ 
Table 1. The optimal operational and financial strategy of the retailer. (Refer to Chen and Cai, 2011) 
 
 
Fig. 3. The optimal order level ܳிכ  as a function of the initial capital B. (Refer to Chen and Cai, 2011) 
5. The role of 3PL firm in supply chain financing 
Following the above discussion about simple supply chain with a supplier and a retailer, we 
then introduce how the third party logistics (3PL) firm plays an important role in adding 
value to all parties and supply chain as a whole. 
In this section, we investigate three different roles of a 3PL firm in an extended supply chain 
with a supplier, a retailer, a 3PL firm, and a bank. The retailer is capital-constrained and 
may borrow capital from either the bank or the 3PL firm. The first role is called the 
Traditional Role (TR), where the 3PL firm provides only the traditional logistics services in 
the supply chain when the retailer borrows capital from the bank. The second role is 
regarded as the Delegation Role (DL), in which the 3PL firm aligning with the bank 
provides capital-constrained retailer with the integrated logistics and financing service. The 
third role is referred to as the Control Role (CR), where the 3PL firm provides both logistics 
services and trade credit financing to the capital-constrained retailer. Note that in supply 
chain finance, 3PL plays as either DR or CR. 
The retailer is of limited liability and procures a single product from the supplier with a 
wholesale price  wp, and then sells to a random market by a fixed retail price p normalised to 
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be one. More specially, the 3PL firm offering TR or DR to the capital-constrained retailer is 
also involved in the supply chain. Without loss of generality, this paper assumes that the 
3PL firm would charge the retailer wl for per unit product under TR or DR with cost cl per 
unit in its business operations. 
To make the operations of supply chain feasible, we offer the following assumption. 
 
Assumption A2: wl ൐ cl  , wp ൐ cp   and ሺͳ ൅ rሻ൫wp ൅ wl൯ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ rሻw ൏ ͳ 
5.1 3PL firm with TR in SCF 
With TR, we consider 3PL firms offering traditional logistics service to the supply chain, and 
then analyse the capital availability to the capital-constrained retailer. The roles of suppliers 
and 3PL firms are passive, and their payoffs depend on retailer’s ordering quantity only. 
Suppose that the retailer borrows funds from a bank in a monopolistic financial market and 
pays the supplier in full payment for the stock of goods purchased, we may then focus on 
studying the interplay between the retailer and the bank. 
We first discuss the game between the bank and the retailer under symmetric information 
and show that the retailer cannot separate operations and financial decisions in a 
monopolistic financial market. Then, we show that under asymmetric information on 
retailer’s initial capital, the bank may refuse to provide commercial loans for capital- 
constrained retailers. 
Decisions of retailer and bank under symmetric information 
Before characterizing the bank’s decisions of interest rate, we start with examining capital-
constrained retailer’s optimal strategies. 
The retailer’s optimal strategies 
Based on Eq (2), for a given r୑ሺBሻ (the interest rate on a loan in the monopolistic finance 
market), we rewrite the retailer problem as follows: ߎெோ ൌ ݉ܽݔொಾሺ஻ሻ ܧ ൜ቀ݉݅݊ሼܦ, ܳெሺܤሻሽ െ ሺݓܳெሺܤሻ െ ܤሻ൫ͳ ൅ ݎெሺܤሻ൯ቁା െ ܤൠ (8)
The characteristics for the retailer’s optimal ordering strategy and its basic properties can be 
written by the following: Suppose Assumptions A1 and A2. Under symmetric information, 
regardless the 3PL firm playing TR or CR, at a given interest rate on a loan r୑ሺBሻ in a 
monopolistic financial market (1) the optimal ordering quantity of the retailer, Qכ , is given 
by FതሺQ୑ሻ  ൌ  w൫ͳ ൅ r୑ሺBሻ൯Fത ൣሺwQ୑ሺBሻ െ ܤሻ൫ͳ ൅ r୑ሺBሻ൯൧; (2) the capital-constrained retailer 
should get a loan with size ሺwQכ െ  Bሻ. (Refer to Chen and Cai, 2011). 
As the retail price is normalised to 1, Fതሺܳெכ ሻ  represents the retailer’s expected marginal 
revenue from ordering an additional unit, while the expected marginal cost of ordering an 
additional unit is wሺͳ ൅ r୑ሻFത ൣሺwQ୑ሺBሻ െ ܤሻ൫ͳ ൅ r୑ሺBሻ൯൧. The volume of marginal cost 
depends on the interest rate r୑ሺBሻ, and might be greater or less than the marginal cost in 
traditional newsvendor model. 
Here, we show that in the capital-constrained supply chain, the retailer’s operational 
decision (e.g. ordering quantity) and financial decisions (e.g. loan size) cannot be separated. 
Consequently, under perfect information, the Modigliani-Miller Theory cannot hold water 
in this setting. If the capital markets are perfect, Modigliani and Miller (1958) hold that the 
managers may consider financial decisions independent of the firm’s operational decisions. 
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In contrast, we show that the capital-constrained retailer has to integrate the operations and 
financial decisions to optimize her payoff. 
The interest rate of the bank 
There is Stacklberg-Nash game between the retailer and the bank. The optimal problem for 
the bank in a monopolistic financial market would be addressed by the following: ߎெ஻ ൌ ݉ܽݔ௥ሺ஻ሻ ܧ൛݉݅݊൛݉݅݊ሼܦ, ܳሽ, ሺݓܳ െ ܤሻ൫ͳ ൅ ݎሺܤሻ൯ൟ െ ሺݓܳ െ ܤሻൟ (9)
Combing Eqs. (2) and (9), we can describe the bank’s decision problem in the following. ߎெ஻ ൌ ݉ܽݔ௥ಾ ܧሼ݉݅݊ሼ݉݅݊ሼܦ, ܳெכ ሽ, ሺݓܳெכ െ ܤሻሺͳ ൅ ݎெሻሽ െ ሺݓܳெכ െ ܤሻାሽ (10)
Let Lሺrሻ ൌ  ሺwQெכ െ ܤሻା൫ͳ ൅ r୑ሺBሻ൯. We denote that rሺBሻ  ൌ  ݎெכ ሺBሻ is the optimal solution for 
Eq. (10). We then present the characteristics of the interest rate in the monopolistic financial 
market by the following,  
Suppose Assumption A1 and Assumption A2. Under symmetric information, the optimal 
interest rate ݎெכ ሺBሻ in a monopolistic bank is given by: Fതሺܳெכ ሻ ൌ ݓ ଵି௅൫୰౉ሺ୆ሻ൯௛ൣ௅൫୰౉ሺ୆ሻ൯൧ଵି౭్ಾכ షಳೢ ௛൫ொಾכ ൯ ; ܳெכ  is 
always less than the optimal ordering level Q୒. (refer to Chen and Cai, 2011). 
We then show that ܳெכ ሺBሻ ൏ Q୒. So the optimal ordering of retailer in monopolistic financial 
market ܳெכ ሺBሻ is always less than traditional newsvendor optimal ordering quantity Q୒.  
Compared to ‘deep pocket’ assumption in the traditional newsvendor model, the capital- 
constrained retailers intuitively have to pay interest to the bank, and increase the marginal 
cost of operations. 
The behaviour of the retailer and the bank under asymmetric information 
Suppose the bank provides a loan contract (rሺBሻ) with the borrower (the capital- constrained 
retailer) and evaluates the retailer’s credit risk based on her initial capital. If there is no 
device to screen the information on the retailer’s initial capital, the retailer can falsify her 
initial capital information and get a corresponding contract to increase her profit.  
We then conclude that under the asymmetric information,  given a commercial loan menu rሺBሻ from a bank operating in a monopolistic finance market, the capital-constrained retailer 
with B ൏  ݓQ୒ may overstate her initial capital to get a lower interest rate of loans (refer to 
Chen and Cai, 2011 in detail). 
Accordingly, Chen and Cai (2011) show under asymmetric information of retailer’s initial 
capital, the bank may incur a loss in lending funds to the capital-constrained retailer. And 
under asymmetric information of retailer’s initial capital, the capital-constrained retailer has 
the incentive to falsify her real initial capital to get higher payoff. In turn, the bank would 
suffer a loss from loans due to asymmetric information. Naturally, the bank might refuse to 
extend loans to capital-constrained retailers. These insights can explain why the small-
medium size companies are not able to borrow loans from the financial institutions during 
the operations in supply chain. 
5.2 3PL with DR in SCF 
The asymmetric information of initial capital may break the equilibrium under full 
information and move part of revenue from the bank to the retailer. Hence the bank cannot 
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get its expected return from a loan. As a consequence, some banks might leave the financial 
market because of credit risk, hurting individual firms in the capital-constrained supply 
chain. 
However, the DR of 3PL firm can help the bank to track the liquid collateral of loan 
(inventory, etc.) and share the retailer’s real information. In this case, the retailer would have 
no chance to overstate her initial capital to the bank. Also, if the bank offers loan contract 
menu (LሺBሻ,rሺBሻ), the retailer would have no chance to lie about her initial capital either. But 
the retailer may divert funds in loans to a higher risk project without 3PL firms’ monitoring, 
leaving the bank with a higher risk. It follows that the bank would be unwilling to offer 
loans to the capital-constrained retailer if the bank has no effective approach to monitor the 
retailer’s real procurement behaviour. 
Then we can conclude the motivation of 3PL firm’s DR under asymmetric information with 
the following: Under asymmetric information of retailer’s initial capital, 3PL firm’s DR 
might force the retailer to declare her real information and help individual firms to achieve 
the equilibrium under symmetric information (Refer to Chen and Cai, 2011).  
As is shown above, under asymmetric information, the bank may have no incentive to offer 
commercial loans to the capital-constrained retailer with TR, because the retailer may falsify 
her initial capital or divert capital loans. Without DR, the retailer’s ordering level would be Qேி ൌ min ቄ஻௪ , Qேቅ. But with DR, the bank would be encouraged to provide loans for the 
capital-constrained retailer. And the ordering level for the capital-constrained retailer Qிכ  ൌ  minሼQெכ , Qேሽ is always no less than Qேி.  
Since the payoffs of supplier, 3PL firm, and the supply chain involving the bank and 3PL 
firm are respectively, Πௌ ൌ ൫w୮ െ c୮൯ܳ, Π௅ ൌ ሺw୪ െ c୪ሻܳ, Πௌ஼ ൌ Eሾ݉݅݊ሾܦ, ܳሿ െ ܥܳሿ, we can 
obtain the following results directly: The payoffs of individual firms in the capital-
constrained supply chain with DR are greater than those with TR. (Refer to Chen and Cai, 
2011).  
As DR brings all entities to the table – 3PL firm, bank, buyer and supplier, it helps to bridge 
the information gap and understand the needs of each party. As we explained earlier in the 
introduction the role of 3PL firm’s DR for capital optimization within a capital-constrained 
supply chain, the coupling of information and physical control benefits lenders in the 
supply chain as well. For instance, the mitigation of risk allows more capital to be raised, or 
more capital to be assessed sooner. So the supply chain would be more efficient with the 
innovation service, DR of 3PL firm. 
We move on to show that DR would impact the performance of individual firms as well as 
the entire supply chain, create value in the capital-constrained supply chain, and that 
asymmetric information might account for the motivation of DR.  
5.3 Competitive financial market and SCF  
DR of 3PL firm might decrease the financial risk when financial institutions offer loans to 
capital- constrained retailers in the supply chain. And more and more financial institutions 
have got the incentive to join hands with third party firms in order to enhance their profits 
and competitive advantages, which raises competition in the finance market. For instance, 
the 3PL firm could ally with many banks to provide integrated logistics and financing 
service to its clients in the supply chain, and banks have to confront a more competitive 
market in offering loans to capital-constrained retailers. We next examine how competition 
in the finance market influences decisions of agents in the supply chain. 
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The interest rate of a loan 
Since the bank is risk-neutral and operates in a competitive financial market, it will set an 
interest rate rሺBሻ that yields the expected profit. The profit is equal to the one generated by 
risk-free interest rate r୤. In this chapter, we assume r୤ ൌ Ͳ. 
In Eq (4), the bank may determine the optimal interest rate ݎ஻כሺBሻ as follows: ሺݓܳ஼ி െ ܤሻା ൌ ܧ ൣ݉݅݊൛ሺݓܳ஼ி െ ܤሻା൫ͳ ൅ ݎሺܤሻ൯, ࣦൟ൧ (11)
We can derive the optimal interest rate for a bank in the following: For a given ordering 
level QେF ൒  Ͳ and C ൑  w ൑  ͳ, where C denotes the production cost, the retailer with an 
initial capital B may borrow a loan ሺwQେF െ Bሻା from a bank in the competitive finance 
market. If the capital-constrained retailer is of limited liability, there exists a unique interest 
rate r஻כ  charged by the bank through solving (11), while r஻כ  is monotonically decreasing in 
retailer's initial capital B. 
As the finance market is highly competitive, the bank’s equilibrium interest rate r஻כ  equates 
the expected discounted return from the loan ሺwQେF െ Bሻା subtracting its costs. We note that r஻כ  depends on the retailer’s initial capital B. As B increases over the internal ሾͲ, wQ୒ሿ, the 
loan size decreases and so does the bank’s risk associated with the retailer’s limited liability. 
Therefore, the prevailing interest rate decreases. 
The retailer’s optimal strategy 
Fascinatingly, the above problem corresponds to the standard newsvendor problem. By 
combining Eqs (2) and (6), we can immediately get the following results：Suppose 
Assumptions A1 and A2. In the competitive financial market with DR, the optimal ordering 
level for a capital-constrained retailer is Q஼ிכ ሺܤሻ  ൌ  Q୒ (the standard newsvendor quantity) 
and is independent of her initial capital B. In addition, the capital-constrained retailer would 
borrow ሺݓQ୒ െ ܤሻ from the bank.  
The above results are related to Modigliani-Miller Theory. In this chapter, we show that the 
retailer’s financial decisions on loan size can be separated from ordering decisions, and the 
ordering decision is the constant value and corresponds to the optimal ordering level in 
traditional newsvendor model. We then conclude that the competitive financial market can 
decouple financial and operational decisions of the capital-constrained retailer. (Refer to 
Chen and Cai, 2011) 
The competitive financial market motivates the capital-constrained retailer to order a 
quantity up to Q୒, which increases the value of all players in the supply chain. As a result, 
the competitive financial market creates value in the capital-constrained supply chain. 
5.4 The value of 3PL firm with CR in SCF 
In the traditional role model, the 3PL firm provides the transportation service only and does 
not provide any screening effect as suggested in adverse selection. Lu et al. (2009) mention 
the incentive of logistics service provider (LSP) to provide financial support to the 
retailer/supplier and to establish the backup inventory. We will inspect more deeply on 3Pl 
financing. If the 3PL firm forms an alliance with the bank, then the 3PL firm could monitor 
the transaction of products from the supplier to the retailer for the bank. Consequently, the 
retailer’s false revelation of the initial capital would be discovered and prohibited.  
In the control role model, the 3PL firm provides not only logistics services but also trade 
credit to the retailer. While the retailer has insufficient capital to order directly from the 
supplier, the 3PL firm procures the products from the supplier for the retailer through trade 
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credit financing and then transports them to the retailer. In addition, the 3PL firm can 
effectively track and monitor the transaction of products in addition to providing trade 
credit to the capital-constrained retailer. 
In the first stage of the Stackelberg game, the 3PL firm offers a trade credit contract 
(w, rୡ୪ሺܤሻ) and in the second stage, the retailer orders Q௖௟כ ሺܤሻ from the supplier through the 
3PL firm. The retailer’s decision process is the same as in the traditional role model. The 3PL 
firm’s profit is given as follows. 
        ߎ௖௟ଷ௉௅ሺܤሻ ൌ ݉ܽݔ଴ ஸ ௥೎೗ ሺ஻ሻ ஸ ௥̃ሺ஻ሻ ܧ ቄሺݓ െ ܥ௖௟ሻܳ௖௟כ ሺܤሻ ൅ ሺݓܳ௖௟כ ሺܤሻ െ ܤሻାݎ௖௟ ሺܤሻെ ቀ݉݅݊ሾܦ, ܳ௖௟כ ሺܤሻሿ െ ሺݓܳ௖௟כ ሺܤሻ െ ܤሻ൫ͳ ൅ ݎ௖௟ ሺܤሻ൯ቁିቅ (12)
 
where ܥ௖௟ ൌ  w୮ ൅  c୪ represents procurement and logistics operational costs incurred to the 
3PL firm and xି  ൌ  minሼx, Ͳሽ. The above payoff consists of two components: the operational 
revenue ሺw െ ܥ௖௟ሻܳ௖௟כ ሺBሻ and the financial revenue ሺwܳ௖௟כ ሺBሻ െ ܤሻ െ ቀ݉݅݊ሾܦ, ܳ௖௟כ ሺBሻሿ െሺݓܳ௖௟כ ሺBሻ െ ܤሻ൫ͳ ൅ rୡ୪ ሺBሻ൯ቁି. It is straightforward that the operational profit is positive as 
long as w ൐  ܥ௖௟; however, the financial profit could end up with a negative value if demand 
uncertainty is too high; as a result the retailer could not repay the trade credit plus interest. 
Thus, a trade-off occurs: on the one hand, the 3PL would like to choose a small rୡ୪ ሺBሻ to 
improve operational performance; on the other hand, the 3PL would like to choose a large rୡ୪ ሺBሻ to satisfy his financial motive. The 3PL firm optimizes its trade credit contract while 
taking both motives into consideration.  
We characterize the optimal interest rate in the following: In the control role model, the 
optimal interest rate r௖௟כ ሺBሻ for the 3PL firm financing is 
 r௖௟כ ሺBሻ ൌ ቐ r෤ሺBሻ                                        if Ԗୡ୪൫r෤ሺBሻ൯ ൑ ͳ,Ͳ                                                      if Ԗୡ୪ሺͲሻ ൒ ͳ,r෤ୡ୪ሺBሻ       if Ԗୡ୪ሺͲሻ ൏ ͳ ܽ݊݀ Ԗୡ୪൫r෤ሺBሻ൯ ൐ ͳ  
 
The unique ̃ݎ௖௟ሺܤሻ satisfies ߳௖௟൫ݎ௖௟ሺܤሻ൯ ൌ ͳ, and  ߳௖௟൫ݎ௖௟ሺܤሻ൯ ൌ ிതቀொ೎೗כ ሺ୆ሻቁቂଵିுቀொ೎೗כ ሺ୆ሻቁାಳೢ௛ቀொ೎೗כ ሺ୆ሻቁቃ஼೎೗ቂଵିுൣ൫௪ொ೎೗כ ሺ୆ሻି஻൯൫ଵା୰ౙౢ ሺ୆ሻ൯൧ቃ  
and even ߳௖௟൫ݎ௖௟ሺܤሻ൯ increases in ݎ௖௟ሺܤሻ א ሾͲ, ̃ݎሺܤሻሿ (Refer to Chen and Cai, 2011).  
If the order quantity is inelastic to the interest rate change, where ߳௖௟൫ݎ௖௟ሺܤሻ൯ ൑ ߳௖௟൫̃ݎሺܤሻ൯ ൑ ͳ 
and hence 
ୢஈౙౢయౌైሺ஻ሻୢ௥೎೗ሺ஻ሻ  ൒  Ͳ, the 3PL firm charges the interest rate at the highest level, ̃ݎሺܤሻ, to 
optimize his profit. If the order quantity is very elastic to the interest rate, where ߳௖௟൫ݎ௖௟ሺܤሻ൯ ൒ ߳௖௟ሺͲሻ ൒ ͳ ad hence ୢஈౙౢయౌైሺ஻ሻୢ௥೎೗ሺ஻ሻ  ൑  Ͳ, the 3PL firm achieves its optimum by 
completely waiving the interest for the retailer. When interest-demand elasticity is in the 
medium range, the 3PL firm can find a unique optimal interest rate that balances the 
tradeoff between the financial and operational benefits. In reality, the benefit of a control 
role model can be even more significant because the 3PL firm can reduce logistics costs (c୪) 
by taking advantage of the economy of scale by grouping many retailers together. 
Comparison of the 3PL’s Roles 
Based on the analysis in Section 5.2, we find that the decisions of retailer and bank are the 
same in both TR and DR settings. In order to simplify the analysis, in this subsection, we let 
discussion of TR include that of DR. 
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It is not difficult to show that the optimal interest rate in the control role is no higher than 
that in the traditional/delegation role. The optimal order quantity in the control role is no 
less than that in the traditional /delegation role. The inequality holds when interest-demand 
elasticity is in the medium range. This result occurs because the 3PL firm shares a higher 
risk of demand uncertainty through the financing service and would like to reduce the 
interest rate to stimulate a higher order from the retailer. If interest-demand elasticity (Ԗ) is 
either too large or too small for both traditional and control roles, the optimal interest rates 
are reached at the boundary; thus, the optimal interest rates and order quantities are the 
same in both cases. 
 Ԗୡ୪൫rୡ୪ሺBሻ൯ ߳୲൫ݎ௧ሺܤሻ൯ Elasticity (Ԗ) ݎ௖௟כ ሺBሻ ݎ௧כሺܤሻ ܳ௖௟כ ൫ݎ௖௟ሺܤሻ൯&ܳ୲כ൫ݎ௧ሺܤሻ൯ Ԗୡ୪ሺr෤ሻ ൑ ͳ ߳୲ሺr෤ሻ ൑ ߳௖௟ሺr෤ሻ ൑ ͳ Low r෤ r෤ Indifference Ԗୡ୪ሺͲሻ ൒ ͳ ߳௖௟ሺͲሻ ൒ ߳୲ሺͲሻ ൒ ͳ High 0 0 Ԗୡ୪ሺͲሻ ൒ ͳ ߳௧ሺr෤ሻ ൑ ͳ
Medium 
0 r෤ ܳ௖௟כ ሺͲሻ ൐ ܳ௧כሺr෤ሻ ߳୲ሺͲሻ ൏ ͳ, ߳௧ሺr෤ሻ ൐ ͳ 0 r෤௧ ܳ௖௟כ ሺͲሻ ൐ ܳ௧כሺr෤௧ሻ ߳௖௟ሺͲሻ ൏ ͳ,  ߳௖௟ሺr෤ሻ ൐ ͳ ߳௧ሺr෤ሻ ൑ ͳ r෤௖௟ r෤ ܳ௖௟כ ሺr෤௖௟ሻ ൐ ܳ௧כሺr෤ሻ ߳୲ሺͲሻ ൏ ͳ, ߳௧ሺr෤ሻ ൐ ͳ r෤௖௟ r෤௧ ܳ௖௟כ ሺr෤௖௟ሻ ൐ ܳ௧כሺr෤௧ሻ 
Table 2. Optimal interest rates and ordering quantities in traditional and control roles 
We can obtain additional technical details, as illustrated in Table 2 (Refer to Chen and Cai, 
2011). The itemized results in Table 2 are determined by the interplay of interest-demand 
elasticity rates in both the control and traditional roles. For any given interest rate, interest-
demand elasticity in the control role is no less than that in the traditional role. If both 
interest-demand elasticity rates are low, a low interest rate does not stimulate much 
demand; thus, the 3PL/bank will charge the interest rate at its highest level in both the 
control and traditional models. In contrast, if both interest-demand elasticity rates are high, 
the benefit from a higher demand will overweigh the benefit of a higher interest rate; in this 
case, the 3PL/bank will charge a zero interest rate in both the control and traditional role 
models. If interest-demand elasticity is in the medium range, the interest rates in both 
models will differ in the four sub-cases, as shown in Table 2. Nevertheless, the optimal 
interest rate in the control role is no more than that in the traditional role; while the optimal 
order quantity in the control role weakly dominates that in the traditional role. 
Owing to a higher order quantity in the control role, we may expect that the entire supply 
chain will be more efficient in the control role. In the control role model, compared with the 
traditional role model, the 3PL firm more significantly shares the risk of demand uncertainty 
with the retailer when offering the trade credit and logistics services together. Thus, the 
retailer benefits from a lower interest rate, the supplier benefits from a larger order quantity, 
and the 3PL firm benefits from the integration of the financing and its traditional logistics 
services. This result provides theoretical support to the practice of 3PL firms integrating 
their logistics services with financing services, such as UPS and others. 
Because of the capital constraint, one might expect that neither of our above models can 
outperform the classic newsvendor model (without capital constraint) in terms of overall 
supply chain profit. Note that supply chain profit includes the profits of the supplier, 
retailer, 3PL, and/or the bank and, hence, can be written as follows. Π ୧כሺBሻ  ൌ  E൛minሾD, Q ୧כሺBሻሿ  െ  ሺc୮ ൅  c୪ሻQ ୧כሺBሻൟ , where the subscript i ൌ  t, c୪, N .  
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The following result delivers a somewhat counterintuitive message: Compare overall 
supply chain profits in the traditional role, control role, and classic newsvendor models, (1). 
The classic newsvendor model outperforms the traditional role model (i.e., Π ୲כሺBሻ ൑ Π ୒כ ሺBሻ; 
(2)  The control role model outperforms the classic newsvendor model (i.e., Π ୡ୪כ ሺBሻ ൒Π ୒כ ሺBሻ), as long as C௖௟ is sufficiently low (i.e., C௖௟ ൑ ௪ିሺ௪୕ ౙౢכ ሺ୆ሻି஻ሻ௛൫୕ ౪כሺ୆ሻ൯ଵିுቂ൫௪୕ ౙౢכ ሺ୆ሻି஻൯ቀଵା୰ ౙౢכ ሺ୆ሻቁቃ), where C௖௟ ൌݓ௣ ൅ ܿ௟. (Refer to Chen and Cai, 2011). 
The first statement above suggests the traditional role model cannot outperform the classic 
newsvendor in terms of entire supply chain efficiency, which is intuitive because the retailer 
bears additional financial risk plus the same demand uncertainty as in the classic 
newsvendor model. As for the control role model, the second statement indicates that 
overall supply chain profit in the control role model outweighs the classic newsvendor 
model. The rationale behind is that the 3PL firm shares the risk of demand uncertainty with 
the retailer by lowering the interest rate, such that the retailer orders a larger quantity that 
consequently yields a higher profit for the entire supply chain. Compared with the 
traditional role model, the 3PL in the control role model coordinates the supply chain by 
integrating the financial and logistics services. A lower combined value of product 
wholesale price and logistics operational cost (C௖௟) enables the 3PL firm to charge a lower 
interest rate than in the traditional role model. This result conveys the message that an 
integrated service of financing and logistics can coordinate the capital constrained supply 
chain, and thus is a win-win-win solution to the retailer, the 3PL firm, and the supplier. 
However, if C௖௟ is too high, the burden of the capital constraint would outpace the benefit of 
3PL coordination, such that the classic newsvender model would outperform the control 
role model in terms of overall supply chain efficiency. 
6. Conclusion 
We have studied the operational and financial decisions for a capital-constrained supply 
chain and the impact of financing on individual firms and the entire supply chain under 
wholesale price contract.  
Our analysis indicates that financing can create value for a supply chain with small- 
medium capital retailer, and greater competition in a financial market leads to better 
performance improvement for the individual firms as well as the entire supply chain. 
Specifically, when the retailer has small-medium capital, she can make loans from a bank 
and place an order at a given level, depending on the market’s risk-free interest rate, and the 
supplier should reduce his wholesale price to encourage the retailer to order more, thus 
increasing the transfer payment to the supplier. When the retailer has a medium capital, the 
retailer does not make loans and places an order at a level increasing with the size of her 
initial capital, and the supplier offers a suitable wholesale price, which is decreasing with 
the size of the retailer’s initial capital to draw out all of the retailer’s funds. When the 
retailer’s capital is large, she never makes a loan from banks and sets an order level equal to 
the optimal order level in the traditional newsvendor model. We also show that interest rate 
on loans would decrease in the retailer’s initial capital. We emphasize that when the retailer 
has small-medium capital, decisions on wholesale price and order level are independent of 
the initial capital. 
Another important point is that with 3PL firm playing the traditional role in the 
monopolistic financial market, the retailers have to consider the integrated operations and 
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financial decisions to optimise her payoff, and the optimal ordering quantity is less than that 
of the traditional newsvendor model. However, under asymmetric information and without 
effective screening devices, the bank might refuse to offer financing service to the capital-
constrained retailer. The main reasons lie in two factors: (1) the retailer has the incentive to 
overstate her initial capital; (2) the retailer could divert the loan to projects with higher risks.  
And interestingly, this chapter shows asymmetric information view might account for the 
motivation of 3PL firm’s delegation role and control role, and both DR and CR could create 
value for the capital-constrained supply chain. As for 3PL firm’s DR and CR, the retailer has 
to declare her private information of initial capital truly and might even have no chance to 
divert the capital loans. 
We then further investigate the influence of the different roles of a 3PL firm in a supply 
chain with a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer can borrow capital from a bank or 
trade credit from a 3PL firm with financing services. We compare the traditional and control 
roles where the 3PL firm provides only logistics or logistics plus trade credit, respectively. 
Our analysis indicates the control role model yields higher profits not only for the 3PL firm, 
but also for the supplier and the retailer.  
This chapter reveals the relation between financing services and supply chain management, 
and introduces how logistics firms could add value to all parties in supply chain. Supply 
Chain Finance is bringing not only more value, but also new trends of innovative financing 
services for supply chain management, which absolutely deserves further study. 
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approach to achieving sustainable profits and growth. This book "Supply Chain Management - Applications
and Simulations" is comprised of twelve chapters and has been divided into four sections. Section I contains
the introductory chapter that represents theory and evolution of Supply Chain Management. This chapter
highlights chronological prospective of SCM in terms of time frame in different areas of manufacturing and
service industries. Section II comprised five chapters those are related to strategic and tactical issues in SCM.
Section III encompasses four chapters that are relevant to project and technology issues in Supply Chain.
Section IV consists of two chapters which are pertinent to risk managements in supply chain.
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